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The current research suggests that taking self-regulatory mechanisms into account
provides insights regarding individuals’ responses to threats in social interactions. In
general, based on the notion that a prevention-focused orientation of self-regulation
is associated with a need for security and a vigilant tendency to avoid losses and
other types of negative events we advocate that a prevention-focused orientation,
both as a disposition as well as a situationally induced state, lowers generalized trust,
thus hindering cooperation within social interactions that entail threats. Specifically, we
found that the more individuals’ habitual self-regulatory orientation is dominated by a
prevention focus, the less likely they are to score high on a self-report measure of
generalized trust (Study 1), and to express trust in a trust game paradigm as manifested
in lower sums of transferred money (Studies 2 and 3). Similar findings were found
when prevention focus was situationally manipulated (Study 4). Finally, one possible
factor underlying the impact of prevention-focused self-regulation on generalized trust
was demonstrated as individuals with a special sensitivity to negative information were
significantly affected by a subtle prevention focus manipulation (versus control condition)
in that they reacted with reduced trust in the trust game (Study 5). In sum, the current
findings document the crucial relevance of self-regulatory orientations as conceptualized
in regulatory focus theory regarding generalized trust and responses to threats within a
social interaction. The theoretical and applied implications of the findings are discussed.
Keywords: generalized trust/distrust, regulatory focus, self-regulation, sensitivity to negative information
Introduction
Vigilant Prevention-Focused Self-Regulation and Generalized Trust
Self-regulatory orientations influence many fundamental social cognitive as well as social interac-
tive mechanisms and affect individuals’ thought processes, emotions, and behavioral tendencies in
social interactions (for an overview of the field of self-regulation research, see the volume edited
by Vohs and Baumeister, 2011). One theoretical perspective figures particularly prominently in
this research on self-regulatory orientations: regulatory focus theory (RFT) introduced by Higgins
(1997, 1998, 2012a,b). The present contribution aims to explore the role of RFT with respect to
a fundamental and important social interactive phenomenon: generalized trust. Specifically, we
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address the relations between prevention- and promotion-
focused self-regulation and generalized trust, mainly as affecting
responses to social interactions that involve threats. The basal
motivational orientations as conceptualized in RFT play a crucial
role in dealing with threats and uncertainty (prevention focus) as
well as with opportunities for growth and attainment of maximal
goals (promotion focus). Situations where a decision is pending
whether one is willing to trust others reflect a state of uncertainty
in that one is exposed to the threat that trusting others may prove
to be disadvantageous. In this regard, we propose that especially
prevention-focused self-regulation is crucial regarding the will-
ingness to trust others in social interactions that entail threats.
Overall, the present research adds to and extends a growing
body of research, which puts the spotlight on the self-regulatory
character of psychological phenomena (cf. Carver, 2006).
To build a common basis for our arguments, we start out
with a brief discussion of the core assumptions proposed in RFT.
Based on this, we offer a conceptual analysis to explore the rela-
tion between prevention-focused self-regulation and generalized
trust.
Core Assumptions of Regulatory Focus
Theory
Extending the basic hedonic principle that people approach plea-
sure and avoid pain, RFT holds that it is necessary to differentiate
distinct types of pleasures and distinct types of pain and to assess
the specific strategic orientations and types of goal pursuit that
reflect self-regulation guided by two distinct motivational sys-
tems – promotion focus and prevention focus (Higgins, 1998,
2012a,b; Molden et al., 2008). Self-regulation with a promotion
focus is characterized as the motivation to attain growth and
nurturance, to bring one’s actual self into alignment with one’s
ideal self, as well as the desire to reach gains (and to avoid non-
gains). In contrast, self-regulation with a prevention focus entails
the motivation to attain security, to bring one’s actual self into
alignment with one’s ought self (i.e., fulfilling one’s duties and
obligations), as well as the desire to avoid losses (and to attain
non-losses).
Both types of regulatory orientations are presumed to be
related to specific consequences. RFT postulates several conse-
quences of self-regulation with a promotion focus: (a) a special
sensitivity to the presence or absence of positive outcomes, (b)
application of eager strategic means (i.e., to insure hits and to
insure against errors of omission), (c) ambitious and keen striv-
ing to reach one’s aspirations as reflected in tenacious goal pursuit
that is focused on maximal goals (i.e., goals differentiating a
positive region of outcomes from a non-positive/neutral region;
cf. Brendl and Higgins, 1996), and (d) cheerfulness-dejection emo-
tions in response to positive and negative events. In contrast,
according to RFT, self-regulation with a prevention focus is asso-
ciated with the following consequences: (a) a special sensitivity to
the presence or absence of negative outcomes, (b) application of
vigilant strategic means (i.e., to insure correct rejections and to
insure against errors of commission), (c) a defensive orientation
in the pursuit of minimal goals (i.e., goals differentiating a neg-
ative region of outcomes from a non-negative/neutral region; cf.
Brendl and Higgins, 1996), and (d) quiescence-agitation emotions
in response to positive and negative events. These theoretical
assumptions have been supported by substantial empirical evi-
dence (see Higgins, 1998, 2012a,b; Higgins and Spiegel, 2004, for
reviews).
Particularly important in the present context, RFT posits that
individuals may differ in their predominant chronic or habitual
self-regulatory orientation, and several measures to assess these
individual differences have been developed (e.g., regulatory focus
questionnaires, cf. Higgins et al., 2001; Lockwood et al., 2002;
Keller, unpublished regulatory strength measures, cf. Shah et al.,
1998). The two self-regulatory systems can also be manip-
ulated, that is, situationally induced or primed (Roney et al.,
1995; Shah et al., 1998; Friedman and Förster, 2001; Freitas et al.,
2002).
It is important to note that the two modes of self-regulation,
promotion and prevention, have been conceptualized as inde-
pendent constructs and therefore may vary independently. That
is, individuals can be high on both, low on both, or pre-
dominantly prevention- or promotion-focused. Accordingly,
measures of the two modes of self-regulation (chronic pro-
motion and prevention-focused orientation) have been found
to be largely uncorrelated or slightly positively correlated (cf.
Higgins et al., 2001; Lockwood et al., 2002; Keller, unpublished).
Promotion-focused self-regulation is thus not the opposite pole
of prevention-focused self-regulation. In consequence, the two
modes of self-regulation may display very different patterns of
relations with other constructs, such that one of the two modes
may be related to a certain phenomenon or construct while the
other mode is not.
The present contribution aims to explore the role of RFT
with respect to the fundamental and important social interac-
tive phenomenon of trust, specifically as reflected in response
to social situations that entail threats. Based on the notion that
a prevention-focused orientation of self-regulation is associated
with a need for security and the desire to attain it, a tendency
to avoid dangers and threats, as well as a proclivity to be defen-
sive and vigilant, we hypothesized that such an orientation is
likely to lower generalized trust, in turn hindering the potential
for cooperation in a social interaction. Given that trust involves a
willingness to accept vulnerability and to take risks – a tendency
which appears largely incompatible with a concern for safety
and security – it seems reasonable to assume a negative relation
between a prevention-focused mode of self-regulation and trust.
We discuss the general logic underlying this proposition in the
next paragraphs.
Trust and Its Relation to Self-Regulatory
Mechanisms
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, trust is
“[c]onfidence in or reliance on some quality or attribute of
a person or thing, or the truth of a statement,” and the act
of trusting is defined as “to accept or give credit to without
investigation or evidence.” What is probably the most widely
cited definition of trust in the psychological literature was
introduced by Rotter (1971, p. 444) who defined trust as “an
expectancy held by an individual or a group that the word,
promise, verbal, or written statement of another individual or
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a group can be relied upon.” In all of these definitions, trust
is seen as lending credibility to a person or group without
(conclusive) knowledge about the actual credibility or reliability
of the person or group. This aspect also figures prominently in
Rempel et al.’s (1985) conceptualization of trust, which refers
to predictability, dependability (the willingness to put oneself
at risk through reliance on another’s promises), and faith
(confidence in caring responses) as crucial components. In a
more recent definition, Rousseau et al. (1998, p. 395) proposed
a conceptualization of trust according to which “[t]rust is a
psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulner-
ability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or
behavior of another.”. This perspective specifically highlights
an aspect of trust that is also (if only implicitly) entailed in
the definitions mentioned above, namely that trust involves a
certain level of willingness to accept risks and uncertainty (in
the sense that the individual accepts the possibility that he
or she might suffer a loss, injury, or harm as a consequence
of engaging in an interaction) based on positive expectations
about the other person’s intentions. Thus, the core of gen-
eralized trust is the global belief that people are likely to be
reliable, sincere, cooperative, benevolent, and truthful (Simpson,
2007).
As mentioned, our work focuses on generalized trust. This
perspective differs from the dyadic interpersonal perspective on
trust that rose in the partnership- and relationship-centered pro-
grams of research initiated in the 1980s (cf. Larzelere and Huston,
1980; Johnson-George and Swap, 1982; Rempel et al., 1985;
Holmes and Rempel, 1989). Specifically, trusting a well-known
partner in a close relationship might be different to general-
ized trust including unknown others and people in general (cf.
General Discussion).
Trust can be examined from several perspectives and levels.
On the cognitive level, trust entails the expectation that most
others have benign intentions (e.g., Acar-Burkay et al., 2014).
In social interactions individuals often do not know how other
individuals will behave. That is to say, many social interactions
entail a threat that one is exploited by uncooperative and anti-
social behavior of others (e.g., Balliet and Van Lange, 2013a,b).
In threatening social situations trust decreases, especially among
individuals who possess few resources and who feel powerless to
deal with the threat (Ross, 2011). However, if individuals do not
trust others, they miss the possibility of beneficial social inter-
actions and positive reciprocity (Berg et al., 1995; McCabe et al.,
2003). Some amount of trust is therefore necessary for ongoing
and beneficial social interactions.
On the behavioral level, trust reflects a willingness to accept
a state of dependency on another individual who has the power
to return harm or benefits (Ainsworth et al., 2014). Behaving
trustworthily toward others increases cooperative behavior in
social groups (Balliet and Van Lange, 2013a) and lowers transac-
tion costs because interaction partners need to be less monitored
(Cook et al., 2005). In close relationships, showing trust is pos-
itively related to felt security, constructive strategies in coping,
and emphasizing positive aspects of the relationship (Mikulincer,
1998; Rempel et al., 2001). Thus, showing trust also counters
uncertain and threatening social situations.
Research regarding trust – and its counterpart, distrust –
has also included the prevalence of deception in our life
(DePaulo et al., 1996; DePaulo and Kashy, 1998; Feldman et al.,
2002), and social perceivers’ attempts (usually unsuccess-
ful) to decode deception (DePaulo et al., 1997; Anderson et al.,
1999) and the differentiation of cooperators from deceivers
(Yamagishi et al., 2003). Recent research has investigated the
impact of hormones, especially oxytocin, on trust behav-
ior (Kosfeld et al., 2005; Van IJzendoorn and Bakermans-
Kranenburg, 2012). However, somewhat surprisingly, the role
of basic motivational mechanisms with respect to generalized
trust has been largely neglected to date. Given the eminent
relevance of trust in social life, it seems important to under-
stand the underlying motivational mechanisms involved in
generalized trust, trust behavior, as well as the boundary con-
ditions that may lead to (or inhibit) the expression of gen-
eralized trust. We address this issue by focusing specifically
on the role of basic self-regulatory mechanisms as proposed
in RFT.
As outlined in RFT (Higgins, 1997, 1998, 2012a,b),
prevention-focused self-regulation reflects a desire to avoid
losses and need for security, the desire to reach safety. In
this regard, particularly prevention-focused individuals con-
sider security to reflect a desirable human value (Leikas et al.,
2009). Moreover, prevention-focused self-regulation is asso-
ciated with a special sensitivity to (potential) negative events
(e.g., Keller and Pfattheicher, 2013; Pfattheicher and Sassenrath,
2014). In this sense, Pfattheicher and Keller (2013) showed
that strongly prevention-focused individuals punish antiso-
cial others in a social dilemma situation more than weakly
prevention-focused individuals. Neural correlates also supports
this assumption indicating a greater activity in the amygdala,
anterior cingulate, and extrastriate cortex for prevention-focused
individuals when negative (versus positive) information is
presented (Cunningham et al., 2005). Furthermore, prevention-
focused self-regulation has been related to vigilant and careful
strategic tendencies reflecting threat, defensiveness, and cau-
tiousness (note that evidence documenting a significant negative
correlation between measures of a prevention-focused self-
regulatory orientation and sensation-seeking as a measure of
disinhibition supports this notion; Uskul et al., 2008; cf. Keller,
unpublished).
Social situations that demand trusting others entail a threat
that one is exploited by uncooperative and antisocial behavior of
others (e.g., Balliet and Van Lange, 2013a,b). That is to say, when
trusting others individuals are in a situation of insecurity, vulner-
ability, and uncertainty. As is evident from this list of concepts
that are related to the prevention focus, a prevention-focused self-
regulatory orientation reflects a mode of self-regulation that is
concerned with security while avoiding negative events to hap-
pen. In fact, the defining concepts that characterize trust and
prevention focus seem to be incompatible (e.g., the willingness to
accept vulnerability, uncertainty, and risk as characteristic feature
of trust compared to a concern for safety and security in pre-
vention focus). Accordingly, we assume that there is a negative
relation between a prevention-focused mode of self-regulation
and generalized trust.
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In contrast to the close conceptual relation between
prevention-focused self-regulation and trust, the defining
aspects involved in the conceptualization of promotion-focused
self-regulation appear not particularly strongly associated with
the willingness to accept vulnerability, uncertainty, and risk,
as the defining characteristic of trust. Moreover, since both
types of self-regulation (promotion and prevention) have been
conceptualized as independent constructs, proposing a negative
association between prevention focus and generalized trust
does not imply the reverse, that is to say, a positive association
between promotion focus and generalized trust.
In sum, the conceptual analysis outlined above leads us
to hypothesize a negative relation between prevention-focused
self-regulation and generalized trust. In contrast, based on the
conceptual analysis outlined above, it seems most plausible to
expect that promotion-focused self-regulation is largely unre-
lated to generalized trust. As a starting point, we tested these
basic assumptions in three studies assessing the relation between
self-report measures of regulatory focus and (a) a self-report
measure of generalized trust (Studies 1a,b), and (b) a measure
designed to assess the behavioral tendency to trust another unfa-
miliar person based on the experimental trust game paradigm
as a case of social interaction that entails a threat (Studies 2–5).
To further bolster confidence in these findings, we manipulated
prevention focus in Study 4. Finally, going beyond the global
relationship between prevention-focused self-regulation and gen-
eralized trust, we elaborate on the specific mechanisms that may
be involved by manipulating a prevention focus problem cue
and testing its effect on trust behavior as a function of one spe-
cific dispositional tendency (sensitivity to negative information)
that is known as a characteristic element of prevention-focused
self-regulation (Study 5).
All studies of the present work were conducted in line with
the ethical standards of the American Psychological Association
(APA). All participants were given written informed consent
prior to the study. In order to assure anonymity, participants did
not provide information that allows inferences to the participants
(e.g., names). Participants were paid in private at the end of each
study and debriefed.
Study 1
The goal of Study 1 was to assess whether individual differences in
generalized trust are related to differences in chronic regulatory
focus.
Procedure
This study involved two independent samples of students at
the University of Mannheim (Study 1a: N = 88; Mage = 22.9;
45 females; Study 1b: N = 117; Mage = 23.3; 56 females)1.
1We are well aware of the fact that following the false positive debate it is now
considered desirable to conduct studies with a determination of sample sizes
based on power analyses. Please note that the studies reported in the current
manuscript were conducted well before the false positive debate was initiated
in 2011. Accordingly, we are not in a position to refer to power analyses that
were conducted prior to the data collection. What we did was that we took into
Participants in the two questionnaire studies completed measures
designed to assess habitual levels of generalized trust and regu-
latory focus. In Study 1a, responses were assessed using 9-point
response scales; in Study 1b, we used 7-point scales. In both stud-
ies, scale endpoints were labeled not at all true and completely
true. We used a German version of Rotter’s (1967) trust scale to
assess generalized trust (Amelang et al., 1984). A sample item of
this measure reads: “In dealing with strangers one is better off
being cautious until they have provided evidence that they are
trustworthy.” The scale reached Cronbach’s alpha levels of 0.76
(Study 1a) and 0.77 (Study 1b).
We assessed regulatory orientations using a German version
(Keller and Bless, 2006) of the regulatory focus scale developed
by Lockwood et al. (2002), which consists of prevention and pro-
motion focus subscales. A prevention scale sample item reads: “In
general, I am focused on preventing negative events in my life.”
And a promotion scale sample item reads: “I frequently imag-
ine how I will achieve my hopes and aspirations.” The promotion
scale reached Cronbach’s alpha levels of 0.77 (Study 1a) and 0.81
(Study 1b); the prevention scale reached Cronbach’s alpha levels
of 0.76 (Study 1a) and 0.80 (Study 1b)2.
In Study 1b, additional measures of basic dimensions of
personality (extraversion; neuroticism) were assessed using a
German version (Eggert, 1983) of Eysenck’s personality inven-
tory in order to test whether the assumed association between
individuals’ regulatory orientation and their level of generalized
trust remains robust when controlling for these broad personal-
ity dimensions. Both scales reached acceptable levels of internal
validity, Cronbach’s α = 0.78 (extraversion) and 0.87 (neuroti-
cism).
Results and Discussion
To test the relations between regulatory orientation and general-
ized trust we computed zero-order correlations (see Table 1) as
well as regression analyses. In both samples (Studies 1a,b) pre-
vention focus was significantly and negatively correlated with
generalized trust (see Figures 1 and 2). These results support the
proposed negative association between the two constructs. The
regression analyses controlling for promotion scores (Study 1a;
top panel of Table 2) as well as scores on the neuroticism and
consideration previous studies in the field of regulatory focus research regarding
correlations betweenmeasures of individual differences in regulatory foci andmea-
sures of other trait level constructs. These considerations suggested that sample
sizes between 80 and 120 typically provided enough power to detect meaningful
associations.
2We also assessed an alternative regulatory focus instrument developed in our lab
(Keller, unpublished) that has been used in several studies (cf. Keller and Bless,
2008; Leder et al., 2013, 2015). The alternative regulatory focus scale was assessed
after the Lockwood scale in this study (with six items taken from the need for cogni-
tion scale as filler items between the Lockwood scale and the alternative regulatory
focus scale). A sample promotion-item of this instrument reads: “If I know that
my performance is being evaluated by other people that spurs me on and increases
my ambition to do well.” A sample prevention-item reads: “My life is often shaped
by fear of failure and negative events.” Both scales were internally consistent and
reached acceptable Cronbach’s alpha levels (Promotion: 0.65; Prevention: 0.81).
Note that these scales are conceptually similar to the Lockwood et al. (2002) scales
(cf. Keller, unpublished). For reasons of brevity, and given that the Lockwood et al.
(2002) instrument is the more established measure of chronic regulatory focus, we
focus on these latter scales in the results section.
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TABLE 1 | Zero-order correlations between variables included in Studies 1a,b.
Prevention Promotion Generalized trust Neuroticism Extraversion
Prevention – −0.02 −0.47∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗∗ −0.27∗∗
Promotion 0.22∗ – −0.19∗ −0.08 0.28∗∗
Generalized trust −0.37∗∗∗ −0.19+ – −0.24∗ 0.10
Results obtained in Study 1a are shown below the diagonal; results of Study 1b are depicted above the diagonal. + < 0.07; ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
FIGURE 1 | X–Y plot of Study 1a.
FIGURE 2 | X–Y plot of Study 1b.
extraversion scales (Study 1b; bottom panel ofTable 2) reveal that
this relation is robust.
One unexpected aspect of the findings that emerged in Study
1 is the fact that the promotion scale did show a modest
negative association with generalized trust scores. One may
speculate that this modest negative relation may be attributed
to the fact that promotion–focused self-regulation has been
TABLE 2 | Regression analyses testing regulatory focus, neuroticism, and
extraversion as predictors of generalized trust scores in Studies 1a,b.
Criterion Predictor F R2 B SE B β
Generalized
trust
7.40∗∗ 0.148
Prevention −.242 0.073 −0.339∗∗
Promotion −0.116 0.097 −0.123
Generalized
trust
10.83∗∗∗ 0.279
Prevention −0.443 0.085 −0.574∗∗∗
Promotion −0.211 0.085 −0.208∗
Neuroticism 0.125 0.088 0.164
Extraversion 0.065 0.092 0.064
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
proven to be positively related to human values reflecting
self-enhancement (achievement and power; cf. Leikas et al.,
2009; Keller, unpublished) and negatively related to values
reflecting self-transcendence (universalism and benevolence;
cf. Leikas et al., 2009; Keller, unpublished). Given that self-
enhancement values haven been found to relate negatively to
generalized trust (e.g., Tatarko, 2013), the modest negative rela-
tion between promotion focus and trust observed in our study
may reflect the specific value connotation of promotion-focused
self-regulation. However, this is a post hoc consideration and as
outlined above, there are no strong reasons to predict a negative
relation between the promotion focus and generalized trust on
conceptual grounds (and in line with this reasoning we did not
find such a negative relation in the studies reported below).
In combination, the present results support our reasoning
that a prevention-focused self-regulatory orientation is inversely
related to generalized trust. In the next studies we turn to test our
hypothesis within a social interaction that entails threats.
Study 2
We designed Study 2 to replicate the negative relation between
prevention-focused self-regulation and trust using the trust
game introduced by Berg et al. (1995). In the trust game,
the decision to transfer money to an unfamiliar interac-
tion partner is taken as a good proxy of trustful behavior
(e.g., Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004; Buchan and Croson, 2004;
Kosfeld et al., 2005; Greifeneder et al., 2011). In this experimen-
tal game, participants initially receive a certain amount of money.
They are informed that they can transfer any amount of this
money to a second person and that this amount will be tripled
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before the other person receives the transfer amount. At this
point, the other person (who receives the money) is free to decide
whether or not to reciprocate by sending a certain amount of
money back. Thus, this paradigm is designed to assess the level
of trust on the part of the initiator (i.e., the person who can
decide on how much money he or she is willing to put in the
second person’s hands). Individuals with a strong tendency to
trust are expected to send the full amount to the interaction part-
ner, while the lowest level of trust is represented by the decision
not to send any money to the interaction partner. We predict
that the more prevention-oriented the person in the position
to initiate the money transfer is, the smaller are the chances
that he or she is willing to trust another unfamiliar person, in
other words – to respond to a threat (of receiving little or no
money back) with trust. Accordingly, we expect an inverse, that
is, negative, relation between participants’ scores on the measure
of prevention-focused self-regulation and the amount of money
offered to a (hypothetical) second player.
Procedure
Seventy-nine students at the University of Mannheim
(Mage = 21.4; 43 women, 32 men; four participants did not
indicate their sex) filled out a questionnaire that included a
short version of the regulatory focus scale (with three items per
subscale; Cronbach’s alpha Promotion: 0.65; Prevention: 0.61) as
applied in Study 1 (Lockwood et al., 2002).
To operationalize generalized trust other than by responses to
questionnaire items, we relied on a scenario version of the trust
game paradigm (cf., e.g., Buchan and Croson, 2004, for uses of the
trust game in scenario version). In this scenario version, we asked
participants to imagine that they were participating in a study on
social behavior and that each participant in this imaginary study
initially receives a payment of 12€ for showing up. Moreover, our
participants learned that in the imaginary study participants were
randomly assigned to the role of either a money transfer initiator,
or transfer receiver. They were told that participants in the role of
a money transfer initiator would have the option of transferring
an amount between 0 and 12€ (the amount of money each partic-
ipant had received for showing up) to another anonymous person
(the receiver) who would then decide on how much money he or
she wanted to send back. It was further explained that the amount
of money the initiator was willing to transfer (between 0 and 12€)
would be tripled. That is, if the initiator decided to transfer 4 Euro,
the receiver would get 12€ and could then decide on how much
of this amount he or she was willing to send back to the initiator.
Participants also learned that in the imaginary study the persons
involved in the interaction would remain absolutely anonymous
and had no chance to communicate with each other.
Following the detailed description of the scenario, participants
were asked to imagine themselves in the role of the transfer initia-
tor and to decide on the amount of money they would be willing
to transfer to the receiver (on a scale with 13 response options
representing units of 1 between 0 and 12€).
Results and Discussion
In line with our theoretical analysis and the findings obtained in
Study 1, we expected a negative association between participants’
chronic prevention focus and the amount of money they would
be willing to transfer to the interaction partner. Responses in
the trust game paradigm varied between 0 and 12€ and the dis-
tribution was clearly non-normal (multiple peaks emerged: 17
participants selected 6€, 12 participants selected 10€, and 10 par-
ticipants selected 12€). Accordingly, we applied non-parametric
analyses to assess the relation between regulatory focus scales and
trust game responses. We computed non-parametric correlations
(Kendall‘s τ) between the Lockwood et al. (2002) focus scales and
trust game responses. As expected, the prevention focus was neg-
atively related to generalized trust as reflected in the tendency
to give money to a stranger (Kendall‘s τ = −0.18, p < 0.03; see
Figure 3). In contrast, the promotion focus was slightly positively
related to trust game responses (Kendall‘s τ = 0.05, n.s.)3.
When we entered promotion and prevention scale scores
simultaneously in ordered logit regression analyses, we found
parallel results. Specifically, prevention scale scores emerged as
a significant predictor, Wald χ2 = 8.12, p < 0.01, the respective
odds ratio of 0.61 indicates that a one-unit change in the preven-
tion scale score decreases the odds of the decision to transfer the
full amount available (versus the combined other response cate-
gories) by 39%. The coefficient for the promotion scale scores was
not significant, Wald χ2 = 1.07, p> 0.30, odds ratio 1.25.
Study 3
The findings reported thus far consistently support the hypothe-
sis that prevention-focused self-regulation is negatively related to
3Parallel results emerged in this study (as well as in the studies reported below)
when we conducted parametric analyses (i.e., “classic” regression analyses). Also,
the observed pattern of results was corroborated when analyzing the relation
between trust and prevention focus as measured with Keller’s scale. This scale was
assessed directly preceding the short version of Lockwood scale. Results based
on Keller’s (unpublished) scale showed a similar picture. The prevention scale
revealed a negative relation (Kendall‘s τ = −.16, p < 0.06); the promotion scale
was marginally significantly positively related with trust game responses (Kendall‘s
τ= 0.15, p> 0.07).
FIGURE 3 | X–Y plot of Study 2.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 6 March 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 254
Keller et al. Self-regulation and generalized trust
generalized trust. Specifically, prevention-focused self-regulation
leads to responding with less trust in a social interaction paradigm
that involves a threat. Given that Studies 1 and 2 were based on
self-report measures of generalized trust and a scenario version
of the trust game, it remains to be tested whether the relation
holds when we assess actual trust behavior. To address this criti-
cal question, we assessed whether participants’ actual transfer of
real money in the trust game paradigm was similarly affected by
the individuals’ level of prevention-focused orientation.
Procedure
Seventy-seven students at the University of Mannheim
(Mage = 22.4; 37 women) participated in this study and
received monetary compensation (2€ plus extra money depend-
ing on their response in the experimental setting, see description
below). Four participants were excluded because they did not
follow experimental procedures adequately, leaving a sample size
of 73 for subsequent analyses.
When participants arrived at the lab, a confederate of the
experimenter appeared and served as ostensible other partici-
pant so that participants were made to believe that there was
another participant present with whom they would later be inter-
acting. There was no vocal communication between confederate
and participants. Participants were told that the other partici-
pant would be sitting in an adjacent room and completing the
same material. Once seated in their cubicle, participants received
a questionnaire that contained the measure of chronic regu-
latory focus used in Study 1 [Lockwood et al.’s (2002) scales;
αPromotion = 0.81; αPrevention = 0.76].
Trust Game Paradigm Involving Real Money
After completing the regulatory focus measure, participants
received new materials from the experimenter and read that
the researchers were interested in individuals’ reactions in
social interactions involving financial decision-making. As stated
above, participants initially received 2€ (in form of ten 20 Cent
coins) for showing up and read in the description of the trust
game paradigm that they could exchange this money. Participants
learned that they would be randomly assigned either to the role
of a money transfer initiator or the role of a transfer receiver (in
reality, all participants were assigned to the role of money trans-
fer initiator). Participants in the role of a money transfer initiator
had the option to transfer any amount between 0.204 and 2€ to
another person (the receiver), who would then decide how much
money he or she wanted to send back. In line with the general
logic of the trust game (as outlined in Study 2 above), it was
further explained that the amount of money the initiator was will-
ingto transfer (between 0.20 and 2€) would be tripled. Moreover,
participants were told that the individuals involved in the inter-
action would remain strictly separated and had no chance of
communicating with each other in the course of the study or after.
4In this particular study, we offered no option to refrain from transferring money
(0€) because the trust game paradigm was used in the context of another research
project in order to manipulate perceived fairness in terms of the back transfer of
money by the ostensible interaction partner (cf. Keller et al., 2008); accordingly,
the 0€ response option was omitted in this version of the trust game paradigm to
ensure that a money exchange was actually involved in every session of the study.
Following the detailed description of the scenario, partici-
pants were asked to decide on the amount of money they would
be willing to transfer to the receiver and to put the respective
amount in an envelope provided by the experimenter, who then
ostensibly brought the envelope to the transfer receiver in the
adjacent room. The experimenter then returned, handed over one
of several previously prepared envelopes containing the amount
of money that either reflected a repayment of 100% (for par-
ticipants randomly assigned to the norm violation condition)
or a repayment of 160% (for participants randomly assigned to
the control condition) and provided the participant with fur-
ther materials that are not relevant in the present context (i.e.,
the trust game was part of a different line of research on self-
regulation and aggression that has been reported by Keller et al.,
2008).
Results and Discussion
As in Study 2, the distribution of scores representing money
transfer decisions was clearly non-normal. Specifically, a large
proportion of participants (n = 38 or 52.1%) decided to trans-
fer the complete available amount of 2€. This behavior can
best be described as a decision to “give all” while the remain-
ing participants decided to “give some” of the available money.
Accordingly, we conducted an analysis predicting the decision
to “give all” (transfer of 2€) or to “give some” by way of a
logistic regression with the respective dummy variable as the cri-
terion. We expected findings replicating the patterns obtained
in Study 2, that is, a negative relation between prevention scale
scores and the decision to “give all.” Results of the logistic
regression analysis revealed that prevention scale scores pre-
dicted the decision, B = −0.52, Wald χ2 = 3.68, p = 0.055,
the respective odds ratio was 0.59. Promotion scale scores were
not reliably associated with the trust game decision, B = −0.17,
Wald χ2 = 0.32, p = 0.57, odds ratio = 0.83. The same pat-
tern was found using zero-order correlations: analyses revealed
that prevention scale scores were significantly negatively related
to the decision to “give all” (r = −0.25, p = 0.03), whereas pro-
motion focus scores were not significantly related (r = −0.12,
p = 0.32).
These results speak to the fact that the inverse relation between
prevention-focused self-regulation and generalized trust can be
documented not only based on self-report measures of general-
ized trust and a scenario version of the trust game but also based
on actual trust behavior involving real money in the trust game
paradigm.
In this context, one could argue that the willingness to trans-
fer money in the trust game paradigm is primarily due to the
individuals’ willingness to incur risk. According to this perspec-
tive, knowing participants’ tolerance of risk may be sufficient
to predict their transfer behavior, regardless of how much or
how little they trust the other player. However, such a per-
spective is incompatible with empirical findings documenting
that there are no meaningful relations between measures of risk
taking and behavior in the trust game paradigm. For instance,
Eckel and Wilson (2004) revealed that neither the Zuckerman
(1994) sensation seeking scale (a widely used measure of risk tak-
ing) nor behavioral risk measures (involving lottery choices; cf.
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Holt and Laury, 2002) were related to the decision to trust in the
trust game paradigm. Moreover, participants in the trust game
seem to care not only about the payoff outcome but “behave
as though there is a betrayal cost above and beyond any dol-
lar losses” (Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004, p. 474). Kosfeld et al.
(2005) showed that risk taking can be differentiated from trust
and that risk calculations are of minor relevance in a trust game.
Accordingly, it appears fair to conclude that trust game responses
do not reflect mere risk taking, but a generalized tendency to
trust in the face of a social threat of not receiving something
back, as is evident in several investigations documenting sub-
stantial positive correlations between trust game responses and
self-report measures of trust or reported past trusting behav-
iors (e.g., Glaeser et al., 2000; Evans and Revelle, 2008). Taken
together, this evidence clearly speaks to the validity of the trust
game paradigm and is incompatible with the proposition that
responses in this paradigm reflect nothing but willingness to take
risks. We also want to mention that the findings including the
trust game are complemented by measures assessing individual
differences in trust (Studies 1 and 2) where risk calculations are
less likely to be relevant. Here, the same pattern emerged, that is,
prevention focus is negatively related to individual differences in
trust.
Study 4
Studies 1–3 demonstrate that chronic prevention focus is
inversely related to generalized trust. In a next step we extended
these finding and tested whether a parallel relation of prevention-
focused self-regulation and generalized trust can be documented
when prevention focus is situationally activated. It is evident that
this would be an important contribution to the current line of
research in that we could draw firmer conclusions regarding the
(causal) nature of the relation in question. Accordingly, we con-
ducted an experimental study involving the manipulation of the
prevention focus and we assessed participants’ responses in the
trust game paradigm (parallel to Study 2) following exposure to
this manipulation.
Procedure
Sixty students at the University of Mannheim (Mage = 22.0; 30
women) participated in this study. They were randomly assigned
to one of two experimental conditions (see below) and received a
questionnaire containing the relevant materials.
Prevention Focus Manipulation
In order to induce a prevention focus, half of the participants
were asked to report on their duties and obligations (following
the logic proposed by Higgins et al., 1994; see also Freitas et al.,
2002). Specifically, we provided half of the participants with a
description of the concept of the ought self followed by a state-
ment referring to the fact that a defining feature of the ought
self was the fear of (a) not possessing the respective elements
of the ought self and (b) being punished or rejected because
of an existing discrepancy between the actual and ought self.
Following this introduction, participants noted three traits or
characteristics that reflected elements of their ought self. Finally,
we asked participants to indicate the person(s) that consid-
ered the indicated elements of their ought self as relevant. That
is, participants mentioned the person(s) who made them feel
responsible (or obligated) to possess the respective trait or char-
acteristic and who may punish or reject them in case of an
existing actual-ought discrepancy. The other participants (in the
control condition) did not receive this part of the question-
naire.
As a measure of generalized trust, we used again a sce-
nario version of the experimental trust game paradigm (par-
allel to Study 2; see also Buchan and Croson, 2004). That is,
the main dependent variable in this study was the amount of
money participants were willing to transfer to the receiver (on
a scale with 13 response options representing values between 0
and 12€).
Results and Discussion
In line with our theoretical analysis and the findings obtained
in Studies 1–3, we expected a lesser amount of money to be
transferred in the condition of prevention focus induction com-
pared to the control condition. Responses in the trust game
paradigm varied between 0 and 12€ and the distribution was
again clearly non-normal (multiple peaks emerged: nine partic-
ipants selected 6€, and 17 participants selected 12€). Accordingly,
we applied a non-parametric test to assess the effect of regu-
latory focus priming on the amount of money transferred. A
Mann–Whitney-U-Test revealed that participants in the preven-
tion prime condition offered significantly less money to their
ostensible interaction partner (Median = 5.0) than their con-
trol group counterparts (Median = 8.5, z = 1.97, p < 0.05). The
results of Study 4 thus support the proposition that prevention
focus decreases the expression of generalized trust. This finding–
which is based on an experimental manipulation of the preven-
tion focus–speaks to the causal nature of the relation between
vigilant prevention-focused self-regulation and generalized trust
as well as to the fact that situational variations (in extension
to chronic differences) in prevention focus affect generalized
trust.
Interestingly, alternatively to what we hypothesized, one could
argue that the experimental group differed from the control
group not only in the activation of a prevention focus, but also
with regard to other factors such as negative mood or self-
awareness. To address such alternative hypotheses, we assessed
potential effects of the experimental procedure (as applied in
the current study) on participants’ mood state in a separate
pre-test (n = 39). The item used to assess participants’ mood
state reads “How do you feel right now?” with response scale
end poles labeled (1) in a good temper and (9) in a bad tem-
per. We did not observe a meaningful effect, F(1,37) = 0.002,
p > 0.96. Accordingly, an alternative interpretation referring to
mood seems not particularly likely. Note that the possibility that
the procedure applied in Study 4 may have increased experi-
mental participants’ self-awareness or general self-focus will be
addressed in Study 5 where we made use of a different procedure
to induce a prevention focus that is unlikely to trigger a self-focus
or self-awareness.
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Study 5
Study 4 complemented the correlational findings observed in
Studies 1–3 by situationally inducing a prevention-focused
self-regulatory orientation. Although intriguing and consistent,
this evidence is silent about the specific mechanisms involved
in the relation. Study 5 therefore relies on an experimental
paradigm designed to test the specific impact of two crucial ele-
ments proposed as characteristic aspects of prevention-focused
self-regulation: sensitivity to negative information and the need
for security.
In this study, we made use of a fairly subtle ‘problem cue’
referring to the need for security that is known to be related
to prevention-focused self-regulation (Friedman and Förster,
2001). This cue should decrease individuals’ trust in another
person. Hence, ceteris paribus, the provision of a prevention-
triggering cue should result in lower levels of trust. Moreover, we
assessed habitual differences in the sensitivity to negative infor-
mation as a second crucial factor. Given our previous results, one
may suppose that both factors – sensitivity to negative informa-
tion and the need for security – affect individuals’ tendency to
trust strangers (which would be reflected in main effects of both
factors). However, as an alternative one may expect an interplay
of both factors such that the fairly subtle problem cue (referring
to the need for security) is only effective in individuals with a
strong sensitivity to negative information. In our view, such an
interplay seems likely to occur given the theoretical and empirical
background as discussed in the next section.
Differential Sensitivity to Problem Cues
Signaling Potential Negative Events
As outlined in the description of the proposed consequences
associated with each style of self-regulation, RFT holds that indi-
viduals are sensitive to different outcomes and consequences
depending on the mode of self-regulation that is guiding their
regulatory system (Higgins, 1997, 1998). Specifically, RFT pre-
dicts that the prevention focus is related to a special sensitivity
concerning negative outcomes and consequences, whereas the
promotion focus is related to a special sensitivity concerning
positive outcomes and consequences. Starting from this propo-
sition, we suggest (based on previous evidence; Keller et al., 2008;
cf. Keller, unpublished) that a sensitivity to negative outcomes
and consequences involves a specific vigilance regarding environ-
mental cues that signal insecurity and potential losses (i.e., signals
indicating that there is a potential for negative consequences in
the current situation). Andwe propose that this special sensitivity
to cues that signal insecurity and potential losses can be related to
the inverse relation between prevention-focused self-regulation
and generalized trust (as observed in the previous studies).
In fact, it appears quite adaptive to lower one’s willingness
to trust another person in situations where one perceives situa-
tional cues indicating potential negative consequences. However,
individuals differ in how quick they are in detecting and inter-
preting cues as signals of insecurity and potential losses – and
the style of self-regulation is most likely associated with such
individual differences. We obtained empirical evidence in sup-
port of this notion (Keller, unpublished) in two independent
correlational studies, which yielded significant positive corre-
lations between prevention (but not promotion) focus scale
scores and two instruments designed to assess individual dif-
ferences in the sensitivity to negative information as reflected
in (a) a cognitive tendency to focus on negative information
(Noguchi et al., 2006) and (b) a tendency to follow negative
emotions (Gasper and Bramesfeld, 2006).
Building on these previous findings documenting a close asso-
ciation between prevention-focused self-regulation and sensitiv-
ity to negative information, we assume that individuals high on
prevention-focused self-regulation have a strong chronic sensitiv-
ity to negative information and therefore are particularly vigilant
with respect to subtle cues signaling insecurity, and a potential for
negative consequences. Accordingly, we argue that confrontation
with a subtle prevention focus problem cue (a subtle trigger of
the need for security) is most likely to result in defensiveness and
a decreased willingness to express trust among individuals char-
acterized by a special sensitivity to negative information or cues
in the environment.
To test these considerations, we conducted an experimental
study involving the manipulation of a subtle prevention focus
problem cue and we assessed participants’ sensitivity to negative
information as a critical boundary condition.
Procedure
Forty students at the University of Mannheim (Mage = 25.6; 20
women) participated in this study and received 1€ and a choco-
late bar as compensation. They were randomly assigned to one
of two experimental conditions. All materials were combined in
one questionnaire, including the manipulation of the preven-
tion focus problem cue, the scenario version of the trust game
paradigm, and a personality measure of sensitivity to negative
information5.
Manipulation of Prevention Focus Problem
Cue
We applied a procedure developed by Friedman and Förster
(2001) as a subtle prevention focus priming task. In this task,
participants complete a simple paper-and-pencil maze that is
designed in a way that there is a cartoon mouse depicted trapped
inside the maze and participants are instructed to “find the way
for the mouse.” Outside the maze, a brick wall is depicted con-
taining a mouse hole. In the prevention focus version of the maze
task, an owl is depicted as hovering above the maze presumably
ready to fly down and capture the mouse unless it could escape
the maze and retreat through the mouse hole. This manipulation
reflects a subtle activation of the need for security. Participants in
5We assessed sensitivity to negative information after the manipulation and the
assessment of trust game responses in order to avoid possible negative sensitivity
priming effects that may have emerged if we had asked participants to respond
to the items of the scale prior to the manipulation. Given that the measure has
been designed as an instrument to assess a stable disposition it seems unlikely that
the preceding procedures could affect participants’ scores on this scale. Supporting
this assumption, we found that the problem cue prime had no impact on par-
ticipants’ sensitivity to negative information scores, F < 0.2. Note that a similar
posttest measurement strategy has been used successfully in several influential
social psychological studies (cf. Devine and Elliot, 1995; Lepore and Brown, 1997;
Wittenbrink et al., 1997).
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the control group condition received a questionnaire that did not
contain this maze task.
Trust Game Paradigm
The description and procedure of the trust game scenario was
parallel to that applied in Studies 2 and 4.
Sensitivity to Negative Information
We assessed participants’ sensitivity to negative information with
a measure comprising 10 items of the “attention to negative
information scale” developed by Noguchi et al. (2006; a sample
item reads “I notice when something is not going well even
if it’s a trivial thing”) as well as the four items taken from
Gasper and Bramesfeld’s (2006) “following negative emotions”
subscale of the “Following Affective States Test” (one sample item
reads “I do pay attention to my negative feelings”). The combined
14-item scale was internally consistent with Cronbach’s α= 0.86.
Results and Discussion
In parallel to Studies 2–4, participants’ trust game responses
were non-normally distributed which is why we conducted non-
parametric tests. In an analysis using ordered logit regression we
observed no significant main effects whereas a significant inter-
action effect involving sensitivity to negative information and
the problem cue dummy variable emerged, Wald χ2 = 0.4.42,
p < 0.04. In additional focused analyses (cf. Aiken and West,
1991; Hayes, 2013) we found that the prevention focus problem
cue manipulation had the expected significant effect. Specifically,
participants scoring relatively high on the sensitivity to negative
information scale (i.e., 1 SD above mean) who were confronted
with the prevention focus problem cue decided to transfer sig-
nificantly less money to the ostensible other player as compared
to the control condition (B = −2.38, t = −2.82, p < 0.01). In
contrast, the prevention focus problem cue manipulation had
no significant effect among participants scoring relatively low
(i.e., 1 SD below mean) on the sensitivity to negative informa-
tion scale (B = 0.26, t = 0.30, p = 0.76). In sum, the findings
obtained in this experimental study suggest that the special sensi-
tivity to negative information that is characteristic of prevention-
focused self-regulation is associated with a strong tendency to
react with distrust when confronted with a social threat signal-
ing danger and insecurity. This supports the RFT perspective
according to which prevention-focused individuals’ defensive-
ness is associated with a particular sensitivity to environmental
cues that signal insecurity and a potential for negative con-
sequences. Moreover, the obtained results support the notion
that trust game responses vary as a function of situationally
induced prevention focus mechanisms. This indicates – paral-
lel to Study 4 – that there is indeed a causal relation between
prevention focus mechanisms and generalized trust. This find-
ing complements and extends the correlational results obtained
in the Studies 1–3.
In Study 5, we did not observe a main effect of the preven-
tion focus problem cue manipulation. In our view, this is most
likely due to the fact that we used a rather subtlemethod to elicit
prevention-focused-concerns to which only individuals with a
strong sensitivity to negative information are responsive.
General Discussion
In relating dis-/trust to RFT (Higgins, 1998, 2012a,b), we propose
that a prevention-focused mode of self-regulation is inversely
related to generalized trust. The obtained findings support this
hypothesis. Across a series of studies, participants consistently
scored lower onmeasures of generalized trust the more they were
prevention-focused in their self-regulatory orientation. In these
studies, we applied different measures to assess individual dif-
ferences in regulatory focus, we also situationally manipulated
prevention-focused mode of self-regulation and tested the effect
regarding different measures of generalized trust. The proposed
relation was observed irrespective of the type of measurement
applied and for both prevention-focused orientation as a dispo-
sition as well as a situational factor. Accordingly, the obtained
evidence can be considered strong support for the proposed
inverse relation between prevention-focused self-regulation and
generalized trust.
Going beyond the ‘first generation of research’
(Zanna and Fazio, 1982) that looked at the question of whether
a relation between (prevention-focused) self-regulatory mecha-
nisms and generalized trust can be observed, we also addressed
the second-generation question focusing on the specific factors
involved in the observed relation (see also Fiedler and Krueger,
2013). Specifically, we tested differential sensitivity to negative
information and the need for security as relevant factors and
found empirical support for the notion that these specific
factors – in combination – play a crucial role and contribute to
substantial differences in the tendency to trust unfamiliar others.
The reported research offers several innovative insights. First,
in relating RFT to generalized trust we document the crucial
impact of self-regulatory mechanisms with regard to a very
important social interactive phenomenon that reflects a funda-
mental basis of social life. Trust is an important factor in interper-
sonal relationships, intergroup relations, as well as in social orga-
nizations. Accordingly, understanding the mechanisms involved
in the emergence of trust (or distrust) among unfamiliar persons
is extremely relevant, and our work contributes to this field of
research by providing insights from a self-regulatory perspective.
The role of self-regulatory mechanisms has not been assessed pre-
viously in the analysis of generalized trust, and the present contri-
bution therefore represents a new and promising approach. Our
analysis reveals the relevance of vigilant self-regulatory mecha-
nisms regarding individuals’ behavior in important interpersonal
situations.
Second, we put the differential sensitivity assumption entailed
in RFT to a critical test in the context of trust and observed
strong support. Specifically, we found that participants with a
strong sensitivity to negative information were particularly sen-
sitive with respect to a subtle prevention focus problem cue.
The findings obtained in Study 5 suggest that prevention-focused
individuals are particularly likely to react defensively, specifically
with distrust, when confronted with a subtle sign related to dan-
ger and insecurity. This particular aspect of prevention-focused
self-regulation has not been documented before and thus repre-
sents an extension of our knowledge on the specific mechanisms
characteristic of this distinct self-regulatory mode.
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In sum, the current findings can be viewed as a contribu-
tion to the understanding of the role self-regulatory mechanisms
play concerning generalized trust, and they enrich our knowledge
about the factors that contribute to the expression of trust (or
distrust) among unfamiliar persons. As such, the current studies
open a new avenue of research for studying trust that incorporates
the crucial impact of self-regulatory mechanisms.
Avenues for Future Research
We want to note that the analysis of self-regulatory mechanisms
with respect to interpersonal trust in the domain of (close) ongo-
ing relationships may result in different predictions and results
than those discussed in the present contribution focusing on
generalized trust. Specifically, one could speculate that in the con-
text of close relationships individuals with a strong prevention
focus could be particularly motivated to override their fears of
becoming vulnerable and to trust the persons in their intimate
social environment in order to attain security that a trusted other
can provide. That is, the desire for security may be satisfied via
the establishment of trusting close relationships and this strategy
may be particularly attractive to prevention-focused individuals.
Consequently, the conclusions offered in the present contribu-
tion may not necessarily translate to interpersonal trust in (close)
ongoing relationships. Of course, the fact that we prefer to remain
silent with respect to the domain of (close) relationships does not
imply that we consider self-regulatory mechanisms as irrelevant
or unimportant in the domain of ongoing partnerships or close
relationships. To the contrary, it appears to be an intriguing topic
on the agenda of research on self-regulation and trust that should
be addressed in future research.
One could also discuss boundary conditions of the observed
relation between prevention-focused self-regulation and gener-
alized trust. Scholer et al. (2010) show that a prevention focus
results in increased risk taking under the conditions of a loss.
In the present studies, individuals are not in the state of a
loss because they have received a specific amount of money to
make their trust decisions. However, on basis of the work by
Scholer et al. (2010) one could argue that prevention-focused
individuals behave differently in a state of a loss by increased
trust. Indeed, the possible distinct effect of dealing with a poten-
tial loss, as considered in the current studies, compared to dealing
with a situation of a factual loss as considered by Scholer et al.
(2010) is an interesting aspect for future research to address.
Implications
Given the strong relevance of generalized trust in everyday
life, we would like to end with a discussion of several practi-
cal implications of the present work with respect to potential
means for increasing individuals’ tendency to trust others. In the
most general terms, our finding of an inverse relation between
prevention-focused self-regulation and trust suggests that indi-
viduals’ tendency to trust may be enhanced by reducing the
strength or relevance of needs and motives that are related to
prevention-focused self-regulation. That is, it seems plausible
to assume that individuals are more likely to express trust and
behave in a trusting way when the needs and motives underly-
ing prevention-focused self-regulation have been satisfied and are
therefore not likely to control and govern the self-regulatory ori-
entation in the respective situation. A related important factor
is the salience of losses and potential negative outcomes in the
situation and hence the accessibility of related thoughts and the
activation of a pessimistic mindset. Our findings suggest that trust
is more likely to emerge the less individuals are guided by the
desire to avoid losses or negative outcomes. Thus, situational cues
and inputs that trigger an optimistic perspective (and decrease
the accessibility of pessimistic and misanthropic thoughts and
related motives) are likely to contribute to an increased tendency
to express trust in people.
Another possible strategy to counter prevention-focused indi-
viduals’ tendency to distrust could be to make use of prevention-
focused individuals’ respect for normative standards and to
emphasize that trusting behavior is normatively appropriate.
Based on the notion that prevention-focused individuals are
particularly concerned with fulfillment of oughts and responsi-
bilities, such a strategy seems, in theory, particularly meaningful.
In sum, the present work builds the basis for a system-
atic analysis of factors related to basic self-regulatory mech-
anisms that contribute to the expression of trust (or dis-
trust) and it has the potential to contribute substantially to
our understanding of possible strategies to foster the devel-
opment and expression of generalized trust. Given that gen-
eralized trust is declining in the general population (cf.
Paxton, 1999; Robinson and Jackson, 2001), and given that
generalized trust is important for organizations and demo-
cratic systems to function appropriately (cf. Almond and Verba,
1963; Uslaner, 1999), this seems to be an issue of great
relevance.
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